Whether in the circumstances, the Court of Appeal was right when it held that the appellant failed to prove the charge of culpable homicide punishable with death against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt.
Facts:
Sometime in October 2011, there was an altercation between the respondent and his sister. Their father, the deceased, who was in his bedroom came out and intervened preventing an escalation of the argument. In the process, the respondent hit their father on the head with a bottle as a result of which the father sustained injuries.
The respondent’s father then went by himself to lodge a report against the respondent at the Police Station. The Police Officer at the Police Station took him to the Teaching Hospital in Abuja. He was treated overnight and discharged. After over two weeks of the incident, the deceased suffered a stroke. He was taken to a private hospital, St. Mary’s Catholic Hospital Abuja, where he was attended to and received treatment until he died on 6th November, 2011.
Subsequently, the respondent was arraigned before the High court of the Federal Capital Territory on a charge of culpable homicide punishable with death under section 221 and of the Penal Code. In proof of its case, the appellant called a total of six witnesses and tendered documents marked exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and I respectively in evidence. Among the witnesses called by the appellant were the respondent’s sister with whom he had the altercation and who testified as PW1, the investigating police officer who testified as PW2, and a Medical Doctor who testified as PW4. The Medical Doctor (PW4) tendered and explained exhibit G – the medical certificate of death which expressly stated that the cause of death of the deceased was a stroke and the antecedent cause of the stroke was hypertension. The PW4 surmised that emotional instability caused by an assault on the deceased could be a director remote cause of the stroke going by the medical history of the deceased who was a known hypertensive.
The respondent testified on his own behalf and did not call any witness. The respondent’s extra-judicial statements were also admitted as exhibits E and I. In exhibits E and I, the respondent stated that during the altercation between him and his sister, he wanted to hit his sister with the bottle, but he mistakenly hit his father on his head. In its judgment, the trial court relied on the evidence adduced and the exhibits tendered, including the extra-judicial statements of the respondent, to hold that the death of the deceased was caused by the respondent who accelerated his death by stabbing him on the face. The trial court convicted the respondent as charged and sentenced him to death. The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal, which re-evaluated the evidence on record and held that the trial court was wrong when it held that the deceased died as a result of the head injury inflicted on him by the respondent. The Court of Appeal held that based on the evidence on record, the chain of causation was broken, and that the cause of death of the deceased was not proved beyond reasonable doubt as it was not satisfactorily shown to be traceable to the acts of the respondent. Consequently, the Court of Appeal set aside the conviction and sentence of the respondent, and discharged and acquitted him. Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeal, the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
Held (Unanimously dismissing the appeal):
1. On Ingredients of murder.
The ingredients which must be established by the prosecution to prove the offence of murder are that:
(a) the deceased has died;
(b) the death of the deceased was caused by the voluntary act or omission of the accused person; and person; and
(c)the act or omission of the accused person was intentional with the knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm to the victimw as the probable consequence.
Kada v. State (1991) 8 NWLR (Pt. 208) 134;Jimmy v. State (2013) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1386) 229.
2.On Burden and standard of proof of murder.
By virtue of sections 135(1), 139(1), and 140 of the Evidence Act 2011, the burden or onus of proof to establish the offence of murder against an accused person lies squarely on the prosecution. In so doing, the extent of proof adduced must be beyond reasonable doubt. Akinlade v. State (2022) 7 NWLR(Pt. 1828) 129; Kalgo v. State (2021) 10 NWLR (Pt.1784) 309.
3.On Standard of proof of murder.
Standard of proof in criminal cases means that every ingredient of the offence must be established so as to leave no reasonable doubt of the guilt of an accused person. This applies to the cause of death in homicide cases where the prosecution must prove with certainty the cause of death and that it is as a result of the act of the accused. Thus, in order to establish a case of homicide, it must be proved, not merely that the act of the accused person could have caused the death of the deceased, but that it did.Ameh v. State (2018) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1632) 99; Smartv. State (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1518) 447; Jimmy v. State(2013) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1386) 229.
4. On Effect of failure of prosecution to discharge burdenof proof on it .
Where the prosecution fails to prove a single ingredient of the offence charged, the burden of proof has not been discharged and the accused person will be entitled to an acquittal. In otherwords, where the evidence placed before a trial court falls short of fulfilling and/or meeting up with the requirements of the law in respect of the burden and standard of proof, then the case of the prosecution must, without any equivocation, collapse and the accused person deserves an acquittal.
See Osho v. State (2024) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1962) 557; Okere v. I.G.P.(2024) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1961) 341; Folarin v. State(1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 371) 313.
5.On Meaning of “causation” in criminal jurisprudence.
Under criminal jurisprudence, the expression “causation” means proximate cause, legal cause, and direct cause. These terms are used synonymously. (P. 315, paras. C)
6.On Different aspects of causation in criminal law and their respective meanings.
Under criminal jurisprudence, the terms “immediate cause”, “effective cause” and “causa causans” are used to signify the last link or connection in the chain of causation. It is, however, possible that there could be an intervening or supervening cause. And an intervening or supervening cause denotes a cause that comes into active operation arising from negligence or the like, even if that cause does not break the chain of causation. (P. 315, paras. C-D)
7. On Import of principle of causation in criminal law.
The principle of causation dictates that an event is caused by the act proximate to it, in the absence of which the event would not have happened.
See Uyov. A-G Bendel State (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 17) 418referred to.] (P. 319, para. F).
8.On Need to link death of deceased to act of accused person.
Even if the period between the act and the death of the deceased are proximate, a court can still not find the accused person guilty if there is more than one possible cause of death. What is essential is that there must be evidence that the act of the accused person resulted in the death of the deceased. In this case, exhibit G showed the direct cause of death to be Right Hemispheric CVA, while the antecedent cause was Hypertension. Physical assault was referred to as another contributory condition but not related to the disease or condition that caused death. Thus, from the totality of the evidence, the trial court made the right deductions and made a right decision when it held that the deceased died of Right Hemispheric Cerebrovascular accident, a medical term for stroke and hypertension. Aiguoreghian v. State (2004) 3 NWLR (Pt. 860) 367; Anyasodor v. State (2018) 8 NWLR(Pt. 1620) 107 referred to.] (Pp. 316, paras. B-C, 318-319, para. H)
Per SANKEY, J. S. C. at page 319, paras. D-F:
“In consequence, the sum total of all the evidence presented to the trial court failed to link the prior injury inflicted on the head of the deceased to the death of the deceased in anyway whatsoever. Thus, the best interpretation that can be given to the medical evidence is that the cause of death of the deceased was a stroke arising from a history of hypertension. Hence,from the incident when the respondent hit the deceased with a bottle on his head, mistakenly or not, to his bout of hypertension and stroke, the chain of causation was broken.”
9.On Whether duration between act of accused person and death of deceased person is important in determining cause of death.
In determining cause of death, the duration between the suspected act of death (i.e. the actus reus) and the death is not important. Accordingly, an accused person could be guilty of the offence of murder or manslaughter even if the duration is long. In so far as the court comes to the conclusion correctly that the act of the accused person caused the death of the deceased, a conviction and sentence will be proper in law. (Pp. 315-316, paras. H-A)
10. On Effect of a break in chain of causation on guilt of accused person.
In order to hold an accused person criminal responsible for murder, the chain of causation must not be broken. Once there is a broken link in the chain of causation, that broken link must be resolved in favour of the accused person as it affects the actus reus of the offence. Put another way, where the injury which was inflicted prior to the death of the deceased is not the proximate, legal, or direct cause of the death of the deceased, the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused person because the available evidence in such a situation does not pin the accused person down to the death of the deceased. This is so because of the novus actus interveniens and nova interveniens, id est that there is an intervening or supervening cause. Thus the cause of death of the deceased in a murder trial should be established with certainty because the act which caused the death is, in most cases, a certain act. Aiguoreghian v. State (2004) 3 NWLR(Pt. 860) 367; Oforlete v. State (2000) 12 NWLR (Pt.681) 415; Oguntolu v. State (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt. 432)503; Uyo v. A.-G., Bendel State (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 17)418; R. v. Effanga (1969) 1 All NLR 339 referred to.] (P.315, paras. E-H)
Per SANKEY, J.S.C. at pages 319-320, paras. E-C:
“Thus, the injury sustained on the date in question for which the deceased was treated and discharged overnight, was clearly not the proximate, legal or direct cause of death.This is a classic case of where there are obvious novus actus interveniens (intervening) and nova interveniens (supervening) causes of death. Accordingly, in the face of possible multiple causes of death, not excluding the unexplained healed scar on the neck of the deceased which remained unexplained by the appellant, largely due to the absence of an autopsy report which was rightly highlighted by the court below, the appellant undoubtedly did not prove positively that it was the act of the respondent that led to the death of the deceased. At the risk of repetition but for the sake of emphasis, the cause of death which is stroke due to hypertension, is not traceable to the injury inflicted on the deceased’s head by the respondent, which had long since healed, and so was not even considered significant, contributory or even worthy of mention in the death certificate. Since it cannot therefore be said with any degree of certainty that it was the act of the respondent that led to the death of the deceased, the doubt raised in the mind of the court below from the evidence presented by the appellant, must be resolved in favour of the respondent. That is the law.”
11. On Meaning and synonyms of “scar”.
“Scar” means a mark left on the skin or within body tissue where a wound, burn, or sore has nothealed completely and fibrous connective tissue has developed. Synonyms of “scar” are “mark”, “blemish”, “scratch”, and “wound”. (P. 319, paras. C-D)
12. On Whether and when Court of Appeal can re-evaluate evidence.
The re-evaluation of evidence is within the powers of the Court of Appeal where it is apparent that the evaluation of evidence by the trial court was faulty or less than satisfactory leading to perverse findings that eventually caused a miscarriage of justice.
Aliv. State (2015) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1466) 1; Anygwu v.Onuche (2009) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1129) 659; Ndukwe v.State (2009) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1139) 43 referred to.](P.311, paras. C-E).
